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Language and ethnography: a reply to Allard
Luiz Costa *
It is a privilege to have The owners of kinship reviewed with such passion. 
Despite his critical opinion of the book, Allard has obviously been taken by it: 
he dissects it, wrestles with it, at times admires it, but ultimately cannot endorse 
it. The first part of his review is largely positive, praising what he understands 
to be the book’s fascinating ethnographic contributions. But, in a surprising 
turn, the second part reviews an entirely different book, one that dismisses 
ethnography in favour of a naïve linguistics. This is no trivial methodological 
transgression, and I thank the editors of the Journal de la Société des améri-
canistes for affording me the opportunity to reply.
I will focus on what appears to be the main offence: that I rely excessively 
on the semantics of Kanamari words, or on their conceptual aspects, in lieu of 
practice, and that this results in an over-rigid interpretation of Kanamari words 
(or concepts), particularly (but not exclusively) of the -warah. I will show that, 
despite paying lip service to “context,” Allard extirpates my analyses from the 
ethnographic contexts in which they are embedded in order to make it seem 
as if I were trying “to elucidate an Amerindian concept […] through a study 
of native language.”1
What words do in an ethnography
It is true that my ethnography includes an investigation of the Kanamari 
words which circumscribe and traverse the kinship processes. Allard dismisses 
these as being based on “dubious etymologies,” but there is only a single timid 
(and ultimately abandoned) attempt at reconstructing an etymology in my 
book (p. 76-80). Etymologies point to histories of lexicalization and changing 
* Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro [luizcosta10@gmail.com].
1. Unreferenced quotes are taken from Allard’s review, published in this issue. Numbers 
in parentheses refer to pages in Costa 2017a.
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meanings, and concern linguistic relationships that speakers of a language 
may not explicitly (or even intuitively) be aware of. With the exception of 
-warah, discussed below, my analyses of the Kanamari language concern the 
content of conventional compositional expressions that function as lexemes. 
Such expressions are composed of non-compositional lexical and morphologi-
cal elements that contribute meaningful information. Any Kanamari man or 
woman can reflect on how these elements are combined to form standardized 
expressions that describe social practices, relations and processes (e.g. p. 26-27). 
Sometimes these explanations can involve translation, but just as often they 
involve paraphrases internal to the Kanamari language (e.g. p. 149-150). I don’t 
deal with etymologies, but reveal conscious meanings of words and how these 
meanings relate to social practices.
The lexemes I analyse and their semantic ranges map an ethnographic space: 
they are benchmarks around which I weave my ethnography of how the Kanamari 
transform predation into kinship via feeding and the ownership relation it gen-
erates. No conclusions are ever drawn from analyses of the lexemes. Rather, 
linguistic analyses invite the reader to follow me in unveiling the practices that 
occur in the vicinity of a lexical-semantic field. Allard questions their accuracy, 
but the reader is never asked to believe them on their own. Proof lies in the 
accompanying ethnography. Lexical-semantic description does not substitute for 
the ethnography, but draws the reader into Kanamari social praxis by revealing 
the idiom in which social relations and practices are spoken about.
My immediate Amazonianist inspiration for this approach is Peter Gow’s 
study of Piro kinship. Gow typically encloses his analysis of Piro kinship within 
certain Piro or Ucayali Spanish words, thereby disclosing how kinship is under-
stood by the people who live it. His method sometimes involves demonstrating 
how the meanings of a word differ from or resemble the meanings of related 
words (e.g. Gow 1991, p. 209-210, 2000; see also my book, p. 34-38); at other 
times he explores how the meanings of certain words find echo in the practices 
associated with them (e.g. Gow 1989, p. 575, 2001, p. 70, 79-81; see also my 
book, p. 25-29).2 We wouldn’t understand how Piro kinship is lived without 
the judicious description of the idiom in which it is interpreted and conveyed, 
made and unmade, processed and conventionalized.
2. See also Gow (1989, 1991, p. 153, 162-163 ; 1997, p. 44-45 ; 2000, p. 47, 49-50 ; 
2002, p. 153-157). This is just a sample. The literary strategy of framing ethnography via 
semantic analysis is a basic aspect of Gow’s work. Note also that Gow goes much further 
than I do, often using comparative etymologies as elements in ethno-historical reconstructions 
(Gow 2002, 2006, 2012, 2013). Here he benefits from available studies of a wide range of 
Arawak languages, which enable historical linguistics to be carried out. I find Gow’s use of 
historical linguistics compelling, though I didn’t attempt anything of the sort in my book, 
nor could I in the absence of comparative studies of Katukina languages (p. 76).
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What inspires me in Gow’s ethnographic style is how lexical-semantic descrip-
tion, rather than being an aside provided for the sake of comprehensiveness, 
or a detour from the description of social processes, is vividly welded into the 
very ethnography of the social processes that he foregrounds. Allard notes that 
I conduct a “fascinating dialogue” with Gow, but he doesn’t notice that my 
much-maligned focus on the meaning of Kanamari words and their articulation 
with practice is part of this dialogue. Perhaps he doesn’t notice this because, 
although I am inspired by Gow’s style, the analysis of the semantic reach of key 
words or phrases is as old as ethnography itself. My guess is that Gow’s main 
inspiration here is Malinowski,3 who had written that “the linguistic problem 
before the ethnographer is to give as full a presentation of language as of any 
other aspect of culture” (Malinowski 1935, p. vii), but also, evidently, that 
“it is impossible to translate words of a primitive language or of one widely 
different from our own, without giving a detailed account of the culture of its 
users and thus providing the common measure necessary for a translation” 
(Malinowski 1923, p. 470). For a few famous examples from lowland South 
America, we have Overing Kaplan’s (1975, p. 69-87) elucidation of the concept 
of chuwaruwang as part of her account of Piaroa kinship; Crocker’s (1985) 
cartography of Bororo shamanism through the concepts of bope, aroe, raka and 
others; and Vilaça’s (1992, p. 49-63) explanation of Wari’ cannibalism through 
an introductory discussion of the concepts of wari’, karawa, kwere- and jam; 
among countless more.
Allard surely knows this, which might account for his uneasiness with my 
reference to Evans-Pritchard’s perceptive but uncontroversial claim that eth-
nographies depend on our understanding of “a few key words.” After all, he 
does not want to criticize him for, say, “draw[ing] very hypothetical conclu-
sions from the analysis of linguistic constructions.” So he recommends that 
we understand Evans-Pritchard’s statement in context. (I suppose it is easier to 
accommodate context where renowned anthropologists are concerned.) He may 
have written that, but he was also interested in practice. Well, of course he 
was. We all are. This did not prevent him from opening Nuer religion with a 
chapter on the semantics of the Nuer word kwoth, which he translates as “God” 
(Evans-Pritchard 1956). The first pages of that book compare kwoth with words 
from Latin, Greek and Hebrew, and consider how kwoth behaves in different 
grammatical environments, semantic roles and in conjunction with a range of 
qualifiers. Evans-Pritchard explains how the Nuer associate ‘God’ with other 
words and how ‘God’ is refracted through experience. This method is repeated 
throughout Nuer religion for different words in the Nuer language, their usages 




and implications. Semantic analysis of key words makes ethnography compel-
ling and ethnography galvanizes analyses of language.
It is unnecessary to demonstrate that what applies to Nuer religion is per-
vasive in Evans-Pritchard’s oeuvre. To stick to his ethnography of the Nuer, 
suffice to recall the discussion, in The Nuer, of the pragmatic meaning of cieng 
(“homestead, hamlet, village and tribal sections of various dimensions”), or, 
in Kinship and marriage among the Nuer, of the semantic meaning of rual 
(“incest and misfortune”). Again, there is nothing exceptional about any of 
this. I quoted Evans-Pritchard only because he very explicitly articulated an 
understanding of a “few key words” with ethnographic analysis; indeed, this, 
according to him, is what “every experienced fieldworker knows.” Relying on 
Evans-Pritchard’s acumen, I added: “These [key] words can only be learned 
by directly engaging with the language and the people who speak it over a 
long period of time. Evans-Pritchard was conceding that our ethnographies 
often hinge on a fleeting moment in which we learn the meaning of a word, 
but these moments will remain missed opportunities for ethnographers who 
do not then take the time to map out all of their consequences through careful 
ethnographic investigation” (p. 3, emphasis added). Instead of being a shortcut 
to reading “patterns of thought directly from the analysis of language,” key 
words trigger analyses of social processes.4 Indeed, they are part of these very 
processes, the categories in which they are invested. Lexical analyses are always 
mobilized as vantage points for surveying ethnography, since in the absence of 
extra-linguistic evidence they would, indeed, be worthless for anthropological 
analysis. Allard may feel that my book is not as effective as the outstanding 
ethnographies I refer to above, or that my use of semantic analysis alongside 
ethnographic explication falls short of established anthropological standards, 
and that’s fine; but my method is hardly so exotic and perverse as to upset the 
“purpose and nature of our work as anthropologists.”
(-)Warah does not mean ‘body-owner’
I don’t agree with Allard that -warah is the “central concept” of my book, 
nor that it is somehow more “key” than the many other lexemes I analyse, 
which together constitute a meaningful set entwined with the kinship process.5 
4. They do more than this: key words trigger fieldwork protocols, prompting us to be 
attentive to occurrence and contexts of use.
5. Allard’s portrayal of my book as being about ‘concepts’ is supported by scare-quote 
references to the word “concept” and corresponding page numbers for my book (only two 
pages, actually), with no context as to how the word “concept” is used in the pages referenced. 
Thus he claims that “Costa explicitly presents his work as the study of a ‘concept’ (p. 223),” 
but here is what I wrote: “This book has been concerned with the Kanamari concept of feeding 
and the dependence it generates in others, a dynamic I call ‘the feeding relation’.” It would 
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However, I can only understand Allard’s motivation for criticizing me when he 
turns to my translation of -warah as ‘body-owner,’ which he feels compromises 
the book. I will justify the translation below, and also question why Allard finds 
it necessary to latch on to a translation, prescinding it from the concomitant 
ethnography in order to more advantageously criticize it.
Before doing so, however, I had best state it outright. The Kanamari lexeme 
(-)warah does not mean ‘body-owner.’ I do not claim that it does. Likewise, 
‘body-owner’ is not how the Kanamari translate (-)warah, nor did I coin the 
composite word to reveal some sort of covert but ‘real’ translation of (-)warah, 
one that I would infer or deduce that the Kanamari posit but cannot express. 
Finally, the Kanamari (-)warah is not a denotative lexeme with a single, stable 
and unchanging real-world corollary defined ostensively, but a word the referents 
of which change depending on how it is grammatically encoded, contextually 
modulated6 and interpretatively resolved.
There are four senses of (-)warah that I discuss in my book:
1. -Warah is a possessive noun phrase (PNP) that describes a salient pat-
tern of relations that are inferred from and construed as immanent to the 
world. It defines the singular in relation to multiple, autonomy in relation 
to dependency, the whole in relation to parts, owner in relation to owned, 
and source in relation to derivation (p. 57). Grammatically, in a construc-
tion such as X-warah, -warah can be defined as that which the argument 
(‘X’) is a part of, is derived from, and/or belongs to (p. 60). It applies to 
contexts in which something emerges as singular in relation to the many 
parts that compose it (e.g. trunk in relation to rest of tree, main channel of 
a river system in relation to its tributaries and headwaters), or as composite 
but autonomous in relation to dependent elements, which may themselves 
be composite or simple (e.g. a parent tree in relation to derived species, a 
major river basin in relation to connected minor river basin). I demonstrate 
this usage of -warah through examples on p. 60-62, 140-148 (in the latter 
section in terms of hydrology, always relating sense 1 of -warah to settle-
ment pattern and political structure, as in sense 2 below). I translate this 
sense of -warah as ‘body-owner.’
2. In some cases, the connotations of -warah are interpreted as emerging 
from a feeding relation, and the effects of magnification and dependency 
that feeding generates in the parties involved. In these cases, in which 
-warah is grammatically identical to (but ethnographically different from) 
sense 1, I also translate it as ‘body-owner.’ I provide ethnographic accounts 
have been more accurate to claim, based on that sentence, that I explicitly present my work 
as the study of a “dynamic” or a “relation.” Note also that one of the two occurrences of 
“concept” singled out by Allard does not concern the “central concept” of -warah at all.
6. On contextual modulation of meaning, see Cruse (1986, p. 52-53).
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of many of the different relations in which ‘body-owner’ and ‘dependent’ 
are equivalent to, respectively, ‘feeder’ and ‘fed’: owner and pet (p. 30-41, 
48-58); shaman and familiar spirit (41-58); mother and child (chapter 3); 
chiefs and followers (p. 137-168); the Brazilian State and the Kanamari 
(p. 168-173; Costa 2017b). Such relations are not always interpreted as 
instances of -warah; they are so interpreted when the speaker wishes to 
draw attention to the supplementary productive and distributive capacity of 
one party in relation to the other (p. 28-29), for which I provide examples 
and case studies (e.g. p. 70-74).7
3. While (1) and (2) are PNP realizations of -warah, the word warah also 
occurs as a verb (I here write it without the hyphen, indicating it is no longer 
a bound lexeme; see p. xx). In these cases, it expresses predicative posses-
sion, and has the general meaning of ‘to have,’ which I tentatively propose 
is a denominal verb derived from senses 1 and 2 (p. 75-78). I show that the 
verb warah is mostly restricted to contexts in which what one has or owns 
is of non-Indigenous origin (p. 76-80). In brief, one ‘has’ (warah) Western 
merchandise, whereas one is an X-warah as a consequence of ‘body-owning’ 
pets, dependent kinspeople, shamanic familiar spirits and so forth.
4. The word warah also occurs as a non-predicative noun, in which case 
it refers to ‘Western merchandise.’ Very briefly, western merchandise as a 
bulk concept is called warah because it is posited as a mysterious manifesta-
tion of the power of the whites, that which makes them into X-warah (in 
sense 2) of (specific items of) merchandise (p. 78-80). I describe that both 
senses 3 and 4 are linked to Kanamari interpretations of and relations with 
7. It is frustrating to have to convince potential readers that my book is an ethnography 
(rather than, as Allard would have it, a “phrasebook”), since it will be more than obvious 
to them. But I am accused of “thinning” my ethnography in order to move directly “from 
thought to language,” so I will draw attention to just one of the instances of X-warah in 
this second sense that I single out for ethnographic exegesis: the relation between mother 
and child. For this relation, I describe theories of conception and practices observed dur-
ing pregnancy (p. 100-101); the effects of the foetus on the practices of future parents 
and coresidents (p. 102-103, 106-110); practices of contraception and abortion and native 
explanations for them (p. 104-106); couvade practices and reactions to the blood of the 
newborn (p. 106-110); how blood behaves in circulation and exsanguination and how it 
relates to the soul and to alterity (p. 110-114); how feeding counters the effects of perinatal 
bleeding (p. 114, 117-120, 120-122); how the couvade relates to the practice of homicide 
seclusion (p. 114-117); how feeding gives way to relations of mutuality, interpreted under 
the aegis of commensality and love as the child ages (p. 122-128, 148-154); how the life 
cycle moves a child from a state of dependence to one where others depend on him or her, 
and thus how the mother-child bond differs from that between owner and pet (p. 125-128); 
how fosterage is tied to feeding practices and the effects that it generates (p. 128-135); and 
so forth. Each of these themes conceals more nuanced descriptions that I cannot enumerate 
here. I have also not listed my comparative counterpoints that understand Kanamari practices 
in light of Amazonian anthropology and vice versa.
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the whites, and provide ample historical and ethnographical analyses of how 
these senses of warah differ from and relate to senses 1 and 2 (p. 80-96).
Although I explain the linguistic usages and ethnographic manifestations of 
all these senses of (-)warah, my book is only really concerned with sense 2, 
which is defined by an ethnographic and a linguistic constraint (p. 65). The 
ethnographic constraint is that my book seeks to elucidate the dynamic of 
feeding and dependence, and hence it is primarily concerned with instances of 
-warah that the Kanamari deduce in terms of feeding and dependence (a condi-
tion exclusive to sense 28). The linguistic constraint is that -warah occur in a 
PNP (a condition that applies to senses 1 and 2). The linguistic constraint is 
only relevant insofar as it encodes a relation observed ethnographically, and 
not vice versa.
The concept of the ‘body-owner’
Allard really dislikes my translation of X-warah (senses 1 and 2 above) as 
‘body-owner.’ Here are some of his reasons why:
1. He is “convinced [that] with the evidence [I] provide it is impossible to 
claim that: ‘“body,” “owner,” and “chief” are imperfect glosses for what, 
in the Kanamari language, is one concept.’” This is in part because of the 
heterogeneous meanings of (-)warah and because some of the instances of 
-warah or warah that I discuss might be cases of homophony and I was duped.
2. His imaginary pragmatics of -warah (frustratingly without recourse to 
the evidence I provide, which had convinced him of my error) assures him 
that the word must be translated according to context.
3. “Rendering some of the semantic range of ‘-warah’ as ‘body’ is prob-
lematic because [body] has connotations of individuality and wholeness in 
European languages, whereas [owner] is essentially a relational concept.”
4. Having claimed that I shouldn’t look for a stable translation to -warah, 
Allard (somewhat confusingly) then proposes that I “could perhaps have 
better conveyed [my] point by talking of the ‘trunk-owner’, insofar as ‘trunk’ 
implicitly always implies a contrast with the branches (of a tree) or limbs 
(of a body).” According to him, translating -warah as ‘body-owner’ is like 
translating the English word ‘chair’ into the French président-chaise, since 
‘chair’ can sometimes mean ‘a seat of office and authority’ and at other 
times ‘a seat, especially for one person, with four legs for support, a rest 
for the back and (often) rests for the arm.’
8. See senses 3 and 4, which are interpreted in terms of predation and the assumed can-
nibalism of the whites (p. 88-96). See also how predation sustains -warah relations in myth, 
and how myth narrates how predation modulates into feeding (p. 190-194).
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Regarding the first critique, Allard relies exclusively on the use of the word 
‘concept’ in p. 2 of my book. The word appears there as part of a vignette I use 
to introduce the reader to the ethnography and to acclimatize her to the sorts 
of issues I will be addressing. I recount that, in the early months of fieldwork, 
I tried to obtain from my Kanamari grandfather, Poroya, a statement on the 
bodies of ancient chiefs, whom I had been told were beautiful and incorruptible. 
I put together a phrase using the word -warah for ‘chief’ and the word boroh 
for ‘body.’ It turns out, however, that the latter word actually means ‘corpse.’ 
Poroya explained to me that the Kanamari word for ‘body’ is -warah, which 
left me dumbfounded. Perceiving my incomprehension, Poroya told me in 
Portuguese that “our body is our owner and our chief.” This is a story of how, 
early on in my research, I learned one of the words that would accompany my 
ethnography. It is as part of this introductory exchange that I write that “‘body’, 
‘owner,’ and ‘chief’ are imperfect glosses for what, in the Kanamari language, 
is one concept” (p. 2).
Allard accepts that Poroya’s explanation “is indeed a remarkable fact,” but 
protests that it “was intended to solve a problem of vocabulary rather than as a 
comment on the bodily and political order of things.” I do not claim otherwise. 
The evidence for the non-semantic implications of -warah does not, of course, 
come from this exchange, which only drew my attention to usages and practices 
associated with (-)warah. The evidence for its non-semantic implications—its 
role in the “bodily and political order of things”—is presented throughout the 
book (specially Chapter 4). Poroya’s explanation nonetheless provides us with 
a native affirmation of the semantic unity of -warah, which allows us to discard 
the question of whether we are dealing with homophony, polysemy or whatever.
Allard doesn’t think that this is right: “[H]aving claimed that ‘-warah’ is 
‘one concept’, Costa is at pains to account for some heterogeneous uses of the 
word. […] While ‘-warah’ designates primarily an owner in relation to what 
is owned,[9] ‘warah’ can also be used as a verb meaning ‘to have’ in general 
(as possession rather than ownership, p. 75-77), and ‘warah’ is a noun that 
refers to Western merchandise (which Kanamari people ‘possess’ rather than 
‘own’, p. 78)” (but which, I might add, white people ‘own’ rather than ‘pos-
sess’ [p. 91]). However, nowhere in my book do I claim that all of these senses 
comprise “one concept.” What I claim to be one concept in the passage that 
bothered Allard is sense 2 of -warah, the only one that can be translated, inter 
alia, as ‘body’, ‘owner’, ‘chief.’ One of the ways I demonstrate that sense 2 
is one concept is, precisely, by comparing it with senses 1, 3 and 4. Again, 
this comparison is not confined to language, since I describe ethnographically 
how these differences are understood by the Kanamari as applying to distinct 
9. Why not “primarily” a body in relation to what is embodied?
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domains (kinship, exchange, the whites, landscape) and how they navigate 
these domains through practices that include pet-keeping (p. 30-41), animal 
husbandry (p. 80-96), relations with government agents (p. 84-87, 173-184, 
201-210), shamanism (p. 41-58), etc.
However, I appreciate that I was perhaps timid regarding the conceptual unity 
of senses 1-4 of (-)warah, in large part because I was not remotely interested in 
“the production of concepts out of ethnography,” much less in doing anything 
as outrageous as building a “philosophy out of a vocabulary.” Without falling 
into the trap of discussing what a “concept” (or, for that matter, a “practice”) 
might be, much less how concepts (and practices) relate to language, it is obvious 
that senses 1-4 of (-)warah comprise “one concept” in the very general sense 
of being a “convenient capsule of thought that embraces thousands of distinct 
experiences and that is ready to take in thousands more” (Sapir 1921, p. 13). (-)
Warah is a concept that converges on notions of ownership, belonging, source 
and prominence. This convergence is fairly typical of notions of ‘body’ and 
‘owner’ throughout Amazonia (see below). The overlap between the meronymic 
relations of the body and the grammar of possession is furthermore common 
worldwide (Aikhenvald 2013, p. 9-13; Cruse 1986, p. 157). Similarly, theories 
of grammaticalization show how attributive possession (i.e. my ‘ownership’) 
is often derived from source schemas cross-linguistically (Heine 1997, p. 144-
156). What the Kanamari seem to have done is to use senses 1 and 2 of -warah 
to take in (and synthesize) thousands of experiences associated with the whites, 
giving rise to senses 3 and 4 (p. 75-96). In my vocabulary, they use relations 
of ownership to interpret new relations of possession (p. 75-76) that derive 
from this encounter.10
Fetishizing translation
In his second objection, Allard insists that the word -warah must have 
contextual translations. I agree with him:
Portuguese-speaking Kanamari admit their difficulty in translating -warah 
[senses 1 and 2] in a consistent manner. Instead, they provide a number of contextual 
glosses that take into account the nature of the argument. These include the 
Portuguese for “trunk” (tronco), “chief” (chefe, cacique, tuxaua), “big” (grande), 
and “the place of” (o lugar de, i.e., the origin of something or someone). However, 
the most common and conceptually most wide-ranging and flexible glosses are 
“body” (corpo) and “owner” (dono), as Poroya first revealed to me when correct-
ing my clumsy question (see Introduction). In most cases when I asked bilingual 
Kanamari to translate -warah, I was told that it means either “body” or “owner” or 
10. Though I do not claim that senses 3 and 4 derive from inter-ethnic contact, only that 
they are at present restricted to this domain (p. 78).
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that both translations would be correct. Although contextual glosses are necessary 
in pragmatic circumstances, I submit that, in the Kanamari language, they make 
little sense. When it occurs in a noun phrase, -warah always designates an asym-
metrical relation that can be synthesized as either the “body of” or “owner of,” 
but also as “chief of,” “main tributary of,” and so forth. For the sake of brevity, 
I shall render -warah as “body-owner [of],” a composite of the two most common 
translations for -warah. (p. 62)
Allard is nonetheless convinced that -warah has a meaning in Kanamari 
which is equivalent to its contextual translations, and that this meaning must be 
pretty much what “body” and “owner” (and presumably the other translations) 
mean in Portuguese (or French or English), as per his third objection. As I note 
in the passage quoted above, the problem is that native translations are by no 
means systematic, nor would they map easily onto Portuguese terms and their 
semantic ranges. Just as a person may translate Poroya-warah as ‘Poroya’s 
mother’ (mãe do Poroya11), they may as well in other contexts say that she 
is ‘Poroya’s owner’ (dona do Poroya, when Poroya’s dependence on her is 
stressed, for instance) or that she is ‘Poroya’s body’ (corpo do Poroya, when 
her intimacy with and care for Poroya is stressed, for instance). Poroya-warah 
captures all these senses, and others, at once. Translations are consequently by 
no means consistently context-sensitive for all bilingual Kanamari: some are 
more mindful of the fit of a given translation to the exigencies of the Portuguese 
language, others are more committed to a stable translation (say “body,” corpo) 
irrespective of whether it sounds correct in the target language. This is why, 
as I note, the Kanamari often say that both or either “body” and “owner” are 
correct translations, and that these translations are the most flexible and wide-
ranging, though one or the other or neither may be the ‘best translation’ (for 
Allard, if not for any of my interlocutors).12
What I argue is that none of the translations provided by the Kanamari for 
tokens of X-warah can capture its meaning, since it doesn’t have a simple trans-
lation into standard Portuguese vocabulary. It might be interesting to observe 
11. In these cases, Kanamari typically provide a Portuguese paraphrase such as é porque 
é a mãe do Poroya (‘it is because [she] is Poroya’s mother’). The Kanamari kinship term 
for ‘mother’ is niama and a -warah PNP constructions is only used for a mother-child bond 
in contexts in which an aspect of sense 2 is to be conveyed (p. 122-123), or when a foster 
mother is referred to (p. 133).
12. I wonder how Allard would deal with the shaman. The shaman has familiar spirits which 
he stores in a container (p. 45-46), but he also has/is (see the problem?) the spirit-substance 
(dyohko) that suffuses his body (p. 42-43). It is in his body and is what he externalizes and 
manipulates to actualize shamanic power. Accordingly, one possible term for the shaman 
is dyohko-warah (p. 59). What translation would convince Allard here? Is the shaman the 
owner of the dyohko or its body? Or take the chief of a peccary herd, also a shaman, who 
carries in its gut a bezoar which the Kanamari say is its dyohko. Is the peccary the body or 
the owner of the bezoar in a “realistic linguistic situation”?
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when a translation is preferred and by whom it is preferred, but this fetishizes 
translation—as if the true meaning of the word were the translation, and not its 
language-internal contrasts. While Allard is preoccupied with translation, he 
has nothing to say about the much more elaborate and detailed analyses of the 
Kanamari words that signpost my ethnography via comparisons that are internal 
to the Kanamari language, and which delimit a lexical and semantic field that 
is dynamically involved in the processes that I describe ethnographically.13
But since Allard ignores this work and builds his critique on a translation, it 
is worth asking: why translate native words at all? Translation of foreign words 
serves a number of purposes in ethnographic writing. It can be a shorthand, as 
it were, which tries to be as effective as possible in terms of ethnographic yield 
and literary intelligibility, but which ultimately only provides stand-ins for words 
the meanings of which are irreducible to a given translation. It would simply be 
too cumbersome for the reader if I retained Kanamari words throughout. Since 
meaning furthermore depends on extra-lexical factors, it would also require 
that the reader keep in mind grammatical relations of the Kanamari language. 
This would not only demand too much from the reader, it would also be a sign 
of laziness on my part. But translation has another advantage: it draws the 
reader into a field of meanings that relates a chosen stand-in to words in the 
target language or in anthropological jargon. This is why I translated -warah as 
‘body-owner’: frequency and consistency of occurrence of ‘body’ and ‘owner’ 
as translations, and the fact that this allows me to interpret and discuss -warah 
in light of Amazonian theories of the Amerindian ‘body’ and the ‘owner’, both 
of which are pertinent to an understanding of -warah, and which are themselves 
affected by the data that -warah contributes.
What is a body?
This brings me to Allard’s baffling third objection. I find it hard to see how an 
Amazonianist—or an anthropologist, for that matter—could object to my use of 
13. I’ve already pinpointed how X-warah in sense 2 is defined by its contrasts with 
senses 1, 3 and 4. For further intra-linguistic analyses, see: on the contrast between wu (‘to 
love’) and owu (‘to want’) (p. 34-38); on how ayuh-man (‘to feed’) differs from other words 
incorporating ayuh (‘to need’) (p. 25-29, 150); on how ayuh-man differs from da-wihnin-pu 
(‘commensality’) (p. 39-41, 145-148); on how -wihnin (‘kinspeople’, ‘a cluster’) relates to 
-wihnin tam (‘close kin’), -wihnin parara (‘distant kin’) and -wihnin tu (‘non-kin’) (p. 146-
152); on how -wihnin differs from ayuhtunin (‘a lot’) (p. 149-154); on how mimi (‘blood’) 
lexically differs but semantically overlaps with -ikonanin (‘soul’) (p. 110-114); on how mimi 
aboawa (“new blood”) relates to mimi dioknin (“pungent blood”) (p. 118); on other uses of 
diok(nin) (p. 42, n. 17; p. 103, 195); on how the suffix -ok generates different denominal 
verbs (p. 117). This sample should suffice to show that translation is less important in my 
work than determining the semantic space that a given word occupies in the Kanamari 
language by studying patterns of contrast and convergence, reflection and use.
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‘body’ in the composite ‘body-owner’ on the grounds that ‘body’ connotes indi-
viduality and wholeness in European languages. There are so many prejudices 
involved in this claim that it is difficult to know where to start. For one, it simply 
isn’t true. In English, ‘body’ derives from an Old English word that denoted 
not only the trunk of humans and animals, but also more generally the main or 
principal part of a thing (and hence not ‘wholeness’, but always the mainstay 
of a ‘whole’). Contemporary ‘body’ can refer to a collectivity or corporation 
of persons, things or ideas, as much as to an individual (as when Allard uses 
the expression “growing body of scholarship” in his review). The same is true 
of the Portuguese word corpo, which derives from the Latin corpus. The idea 
of a ‘body politic’ dates from at least the middle ages and frames a typically 
European political philosophy (see Kantorowicz 1957 for a classic discussion). 
Even when ‘body’ is coterminous with ‘individual’, it denotes a composite set 
made up of multiple parts and their interrelations (which is what a “whole” 
is), and hence a singularity composed of relations internal to it. In European 
languages, ‘body’ is as much a “relational concept” as ‘ownership.’
Secondly, for anthropology, as for all of the humanities and sciences, the idea 
that the body precludes its relational constitution, or that it can be isolated from 
its environment (including other bodies), goes against all available empirical 
evidence. It would be impossible to discuss here the very many (ancient and 
venerable, as well as modern and cutting-edge) approaches to the body as 
dynamic and relational, rather than discrete and individualized. I am afraid that 
convincing my critic of this would take me well beyond the confines of this 
reply (see Farquhar and Lock [2007] for an introductory reader).
Finally, it is surprising to read that my use of the English word ‘body’ must 
have connotations which are ostensibly typical of “European languages”—as 
if by writing in a European language I were unable to convey Indigenous 
Amazonian meanings, a state of affairs that would render anthropology impos-
sible. As Allard must know, a recognition of the centrality of the ‘body’ for native 
Amazonian people during the 1970s is Amazonian anthropology’s coming-of-
age moment, its emancipation from Africanist models of ‘primitive’ society, 
North American culturalist models of acculturation and the like. Pioneering 
statements of the meanings and usages of the body in Amazonia include Overing 
Kaplan (1977) and Seeger, DaMatta, and Viveiros de Castro (1979), but it’s no 
exaggeration to say that pretty much all subsequent anthropological studies of 
Amazonian societies have dealt with the body and processes related to it in one 
way or another. The body is the inescapable theme in Amazonian anthropol-
ogy, whether it emerges as an index of and target for kinship relations (e.g. 
Gow 1991; McCallum 2001; Overing Kaplan 2003), as the seat of knowledge 
and capacities (e.g. Seeger 1981; Kensinger 1995), as a focus of controlled or 
uncontrolled transformation (e.g. Taylor 1996; Vilaça 2005), as a bundle of 
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affects that defines a perspective (e.g. Viveiros de Castro 1996), and so forth. 
Though Allard may intuitively believe that in European languages the words 
for ‘body’ do not imply relations, he would have to deny all scholarship on 
lowland South America to argue the same for concepts of the body in the region. 
Surely, a positivist, even a “vulgar” one, has to take this evidence into account.
Allard recognizes that my book “seeks to advance” debates on ownership 
in Amazonia, but he ignores that my specific contribution to these debates 
involves showing how ‘owner’ and ‘body’ merge. The Kanamari focus on 
feeding articulates the theme of the ‘owner’ with kinship and the construction 
of bodies through relations of dependence that gradually become relations 
of conviviality. This is clearly stated throughout; I never write of ‘the body’ 
except with the connotations that the ‘body’ has in Amazonian scholarship 
and Indigenous discourse and practice (p. 2-4, 13-17, Chapter 3, et passim). 
If there is a theoretical point to be made here, it is that ‘body’ and ‘owner’ 
are themes that must be investigated together. 14 This is perhaps all the more 
pressing in the context of the Panoan-, Katukina- and Arawá-speaking neigh-
bours of the Kanamari, where the body is conceptualized through a complex 
topology of exteriority and interiority, container and contained, whole and part, 
owner and owned.15 The Arawá cognates abonoi (Paumari), abono (Jarawara, 
Banawa) and so forth designate the ‘body-soul’, hence exteriority and interior-
ity, but also the main part of a thing in relation to other parts (Bonilla 2007, 
p. 145-149; Maizza 2014, p. 503) and the “spirit owner” of animals and plants 
(Aparício 2019, p. 229-230). The Marubo conceive of the body as a longhouse 
inhabited by a variable number of ‘doubles’ (Cesarino 2011, p. 35-36, 53-54), 
and one of their words for the ‘body’ (kaya) is also used for the main tributary 
of a river system, the trunk of a tree—in short, the main extension of a given 
configuration, which is also how it comes to mean ‘chief’ (ibid., p. 34, n. 2). 
The Marubo concept of ‘owner’ (ivo) can likewise denote the ‘chief’, the master 
of a longhouse in relation to its residents, or the spirit master of animal species 
(Cesarino 2016). There is a semantic overlap between ‘body’ and ‘owner’ even 
in the absence of lexical identity.
For the Biá River Katukina, who speak a dialect of the same language as the 
Kanamari (p. 10-11), the word wara denotes: the living body; a family of spirits 
linked to plants and animals; the origin of something; and ‘fruit’, i.e. what is 
derived from a tree (Deturche 2009, p. 296). When the suffix -hi is added to wara, 
it denotes the ‘possessor of something’ or the ‘owner’ of a ritual (waik-wara-hi, 
14. See (p. 62), passage reproduced above, where I observe that the most adequate transla-
tion for -warah would be ‘body-owner [of]’, though I suppress the adposition for the sake 
of brevity. However, the phrase “body-owner of” recurs throughout the book.
15. None of these senses of the ‘body’ is exclusive to southwestern Amazonia. On the 
body as container, for instance, see Lévi-Strauss 1985; Hugh-Jones 2001.
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‘owner of song’) (Deturche 2009, p. 294). For the Kanamari, the owner of rituals, 
who is usually also a ‘subgroup chief’ (p. 154), is called nohman, though he 
can also be called by a -warah PNP that takes the name of the relevant genre 
of songs as its argument (p. 216). In Biá River Katukina, in contrast, nohman 
or nohmanhi designate the ‘chief’ (which in Kanamari is -warah) or the non-
Indigenous ‘boss’ rather than the ritual sponsor (Deturche 2009, p. 111, 159). 
There is an evident ethnographic field that is common to the Kanamari-Katukina, 
involving ownership, the body, source-derivation and ascendancy over ritual 
functions and village life. This field is linguistically mapped by words that 
are related to the Kanamari -warah, warah and nohman, and to the Biá River 
wara, -warahi and nohman(hi). Far from being an ethnographic anomaly, this 
sort of pattern and the relations it communicates are common to a number of 
people in the Juruá-Purus region, speaking languages from at least three dif-
ferent families. Much of Allard’s “surprise” at the implications of my analyses 
probably stems from his lack of familiarity with the pertinent ethnographies.
Perhaps I was overly pessimistic about the possibility of carrying out etymo-
logical analyses. Itaquaí Kanamari (which I studied) and Biá River Katukina 
are dialect extremes of Katukina-Kanamari, situated at the western and eastern 
limits of the region in which the language is spoken. A superficial analysis sug-
gests that the Kanamari -warah synthesizes semantic aspects of the Biá River 
wara and -warahi, as well as being a lexical compromise between the two. 
Furthermore, Biá River wara exists in Kanamari as the verb ‘to be born’ (see 
‘source-derivation’) (p. 105, n. 4), and -warahi exists in Kanamari in the form 
-mowarahi, which refers to ‘nameless ancestors’ (-mo is a locative for fixity; 
on the meaning of -mowarahi see p. 166-167, and Costa 2007, p. 80, 102-13). 
Furthermore, the Kanamari word warapikom means ‘wild fruit’, but it is rarely 
used in the Itaquai (where the name of specific fruits takes precedence), though 
it is very common among the Kanamari living to the east, where it also denotes 
a ritual complex occurring during the fruiting season (Labiak 2007) (p. 215-
216). There may be further clues in the dialect variants spoken in-between the 
Itaquaí and the Biá. The role of nohman as a further variable may be key here, 
particularly since the word is also found in some Panoan languages (though all 
specialists agree it is a borrowing from Katukina languages), where it either 
designates ancestral spirits or is a vocative term which spirits use to refer to the 
souls of humans who participate in ritual (Erikson 2004; Matos 2014, p. 151).
Président-chaise and trunks
Finally, translating -warah as ‘body-owner’ is obviously not the same as 
translating the English ‘chair’ into the French président-chaise. In the former 
case we have two predicative nouns, whereas in the latter meaning differs with 
valency: one must be président of something, but a chaise is not necessarily 
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of anything. Furthermore, the term ‘chair’ obviously has the primary histori-
cal and conceptual meaning of ‘seat of a certain type’ and it is only through 
metonymy (a common process of semantic change) that it has come to refer 
to a président, i.e. one who sits in the chair, or the ‘chairperson’. The gender-
neutral ‘chair(person)’ (for président) is actually quite recent: until the 1980s, 
‘chairman’ or ‘chairwoman’ were more common. Similar difficulties apply to 
the meanings of ‘head’ as ‘part of body’ and as ‘leader’, the latter meaning 
borrowing from the ascendant place of the former in the structure of the body. 
The translation of -warah as ‘body-owner’ captures the synergy of the meanings 
of ‘body’ and ‘owner’ in Amazonia: both imply relations, and neither meaning 
is anterior (as far as we can know).
‘Trunk-owner’ presents another problem. ‘Trunk’ is a possible translation 
of -warah where the salience of the trunk or torso vis-à-vis the rest of the tree, 
human or animal is referred to (sense 1), but it is an insufficient translation 
because -warah can also denote a parent tree in relation to trees derived from 
it, or a person in relation to humans, animals and spirits dependent on him 
or her (chief, mother, owner of pet, shaman) (p. 60-65). Furthermore, the 
encompassing level eclipses the encompassed, so that a woman is the -warah 
of her pet but no one refers to the trunk/torso of that pet as the -warah of its 
appendages (p. 63-64, n. 5). In other ethnographic contexts, however, the word 
for ‘chief’ means something like ‘mainstay’, and hence maintains a semantic 
relation to ‘trunk.’ The idea of the chief as a ‘mainstay of people’ has been bril-
liantly described by Guerreiro (2015) among the Kalapalo of the Xingu (226). 
Indeed, the association between an arboreal and a chiefly idiom (a “botanical 
and sociopolitical relation”) is as common in the Xingu as in the Juruá-Purus, 
despite their immense ethnographic differences (Maizza 2014; Fausto 2017; 
Shiratori 2018; Aparício 2019). Although Allard has doubts, it in fact recurs 
throughout Amazonia (e.g. Rival 1993; Kohn 2013).
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